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Legal and Ethical Responsibilities
Following Brain Death
The McMath and Muñoz Cases
Death is imbued with social, cultural, and religious
meaning. From a legal and scientific perspective, how-
ever, death is a definable event. A patient’s death makes
it possible, even obligatory, to cease treatment and en-
ables the harvesting of organs for transplantation to ex-
tend life for others. The clear line between life and death
is important because physicians will not squander scarce
medical resources or violate medical ethics by impos-
ing treatment after the patient is dead. With a clear di-
agnosis, family members can also accept the death of a
loved one and begin the process of mourning.
The concept of coma dépassé (“a state beyond
coma”) emerged in 1959,1 followed in 1968 by an ad hoc
Harvard Medical School committee’s classic definition of
“irreversible coma as a new criterion for death.”2 In 1981,
a presidential commission solidified clinical and ethical
recognition of brain death defined by neurologic criteria.3
In 1981, the National Conference of Commission-
ers on Uniform State Laws approved the Uniform
Determination of Death Act, which defined brain death
consistently with the president’s commission.4 All states
have followed the model act, although 2 states—New
Jersey and New York—require hospitals to consider the
family’s religious or moral views in determining a course
of action after brain death. Clinicians, except in these 2
states, do not have to consult the family before with-
drawing ventilation. Although state statutes do not
specify clinical criteria, the medical literature has care-
fully described the clinical neurologic examination.
Two Agonizing Brain Death Cases
Although the clinician’s clinical and ethical responsibili-
ties following a confirmed brain death diagnosis ap-
peared well settled, 2 evolving cases recently captured
intense public attention. Physicians at Children’s Hos-
pital in Oakland, California, pronounced Jahi McMath,
age 13, brain dead on December 12, 2013, but her par-
ents obtained a temporary restraining order to prevent
the hospital from withdrawing her from a ventilator. A
court-appointed neurologist confirmed the diagnosis,
but the court mediated an agreement to transfer Jahi to
a facility that is sustaining her physiologic functions
through ventilation and percutaneous endoscopic
gastrostomy.5 Jahi’s parents have responded in a hu-
man way—a prolonged heartbeat has led to a false hope
of recovery. A beating heart is also seen as the key ele-
ment for defining death in certain religious or cultural tra-
ditions. However, while medication and ventilator sup-
port can sustain a heartbeat and respiration, a beating
heart is not sufficient criterion for continued life once the
brain has lost all functionality.
Physicians at John Peter Smith Hospital in Fort Worth,
Texas, declared Marlise Muñoz, age 33, brain dead in late
November 2013 (the hospital has not confirmed the diag-
nosis, citing privacy concerns). At the time, the patient was
14 weeks pregnant. Respecting Ms Muñoz’s wishes, her
husbandandparentsinstructedthehospitaltoremoveher
from ventilation. The hospital, however, refused to com-
ply with the request, citing a Texas statute proscribing re-
moval of “life sustaining treatment” from a pregnant pa-
tient. At least 31 states have similar statutes, which offer
varying degrees of fetal protection. Texas is among 12
states with the most restrictive laws, which requires life
support irrespective of the duration of the pregnancy.6
However, even in Texas, the law arguably would be inap-
plicable to Ms Muñoz because a brain-dead individual can-
not, by definition, be on “life” support. Seen in this way,
such laws would apply to patients in a persistent vegeta-
tive state but not those who are legally dead. Texas law,
moreover, states, “the person is dead when, … according
to ordinary standards of medical practice, there is irrevers-
ible cessation of all spontaneous brain function. Death oc-
curs when the relevant functions cease.”7
In mid-January, Mr Muñoz sought a federal court or-
der to remove his wife from the ventilator and to declare
the Texas fetal protection statute unconstitutional. He
claims the statute does not apply in cases of brain death,
infringes his wife’s right to make treatment decisions, and
violates equal protection of the laws by treating preg-
nant women differently than other patients.8
At one level, the McMath and Muñoz cases bear strik-
ing similarity because the hospital, or the state, is defying
the family’s wishes. However, the cases are markedly dis-
similar, with one family striving to keep their daughter on
a ventilator and the other endeavoring to give the patient
dignity in death. Both cases involve an attempt to protect
a patient’s interest (if it is possible for a deceased person
to have cognizable interests). However, in one case the
parents are seeking solely to safeguard the individual’s
interest. In the other case, the interests of the deceased
woman are in conflict with those of the fetus—the abor-
tion controversy at the opposite end of the life spectrum.
Differentiating Brain Death From a Persistent
Vegetative State
The controversy surrounding life-sustaining treatment has
been thoroughly examined in highly visible cases, such as
Karen Ann Quinlan, Nancy Cruzan, and Terri Schiavo. Al-
though there remains considerable disagreement on the
moral and religious aspects, from a legal perspective the
courts have recognized the right of patients to decline life-
sustaining treatment, as well as the power of surrogates
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to express the views of once-competent patients, or to act in their best
interests. This would apply both to imposing unwanted life-
sustaining treatment and to discontinuing that treatment. In short, the
courts have affirmed the rights to autonomy and to a dignified death,
consistent with the patient’s known wishes.
These cases, however, have involved individuals in a persis-
tent vegetative state. These patients were alive, with clear inter-
ests in determining the course of their treatment. The McMath and
Muñoz cases are quite distinct in that both of these individuals have
been declared legally dead. Once a patient has died, any conversa-
tion about the appropriate form of medical treatment is no longer
relevant. This would mean, for example, that while Jahi’s mother
could ask for ventilation for a short duration to enable her to come
to terms with her daughter’s death, the very idea of “treatment,” es-
pecially if it is of an indefinite duration, would be well beyond the
bounds of prevailing ethical or legal thought.
The Meaning of Autonomy
Considerable variation exists in the application of the bioethical value
of autonomy. The classic understanding is that individuals have a right
to determine whether they will accept medical treatment. Autonomy
in this sense vindicates an individual’s right of bodily integrity. Unless
other interests are at stake (eg, a significant risk of transmission of an
infectious disease), physicians may not impose treatment without the
individual’s informed consent. The law also authorizes surrogates to ex-
ercise the patient’s right to decline treatment in accordance with a pa-
tient’s advance directive or best interests.
This classic understanding of autonomy is often extended to the
inverse case; if patients or their surrogates can decline treatment,
it is argued, they can also affirmatively demand treatment—even if
treatment is not clinically indicated or cost-effective. Thus, Jahi’s fam-
ily claims the right to ventilation and artificial nutrition for a de-
ceased person. The family’s claim implicitly requires physicians to
violate their ethical responsibilities by treating a dead person.
Surrogates who assert the right to demand treatment often do
so without regard to who will pay—the family, the state, or the hos-
pital through uncompensated care. The costs of long-term hospital
care, moreover, can be substantial. At the same time, the family is
demanding the expenditure of inherently scarce resources, such as
hospital beds, ventilators, and clinician time—resources that could
be used to provide effective treatment for other patients. For these
reasons, the value of autonomy should not be co-opted to permit
family members to affirmatively require health professionals to pro-
vide costly treatment absent any benefit.
Whose Interests: The Woman or Her Fetus?
The claim asserted by the Muñoz family is of the more classic kind—an
exercise of autonomy to protect the bodily integrity of the indi-
vidual. In essence, the family is claiming the right to decline medi-
cal interventions, as expressed by the patient’s former wishes. In this
case, the state appears to be violating 2 interests: the individual’s
interest in a dignified death and burial and the physician’s interest
in acting ethically by not treating a dead patient.
There is a clash between the woman’s clear interest in not hav-
ing treatment thrust upon her and the state’s interests in safeguard-
ing the life of the fetus. How should society reconcile these 2 inter-
ests that stand in such stark tension? There are no clear answers, but
only questions: when does life begin, how should it be valued, and
whose choice should prevail (the woman’s or the state’s). The an-
swers to these questions have seriously divided the medical and po-
litical communities and the public.
The Muñoz case has additional important features. First, at 14
weeks’ gestation, the fetus would not be viable outside the womb and
the woman’s right to terminate the pregnancy would be constitution-
ally protected. Second, assuming her parents’ account is accurate,
Ms Muñoz is legally dead, which calls into question if the Texas statute
that prohibits removal of life-sustaining treatment from a pregnant pa-
tient even applies. If it does, then the state would be instructing phy-
sicians to treat a dead patient; she has declined treatment through her
surrogate.Thestate,ineffect, isinsistingonventilatingthewomansolely
to gestate the fetus. Third, given the length of time Ms Muñoz was de-
prived of oxygen, the continued viability of the fetus is uncertain and
the fetus may have major impairments. Given her husband’s feelings
that his wife should not be artificially sustained, it is uncertain how he
would feel about raising the infant. Should the state be able to compel
treatment of a brain-dead woman in these circumstances, particularly
given the husband’s distress and wish to give his wife a dignified burial?
A Long History of Settled Ethics and Law
Given the extensive history of scientific, ethical, and legal under-
standings of patient autonomy and a dignified death, as well as the
clear line between life and death, it seems surprising that the
Muñoz and McMath cases have generated such interest. At one level,
the outcome of these cases seems so clear—both individuals have
died and they have a right to a dignified burial; and the physician’s
ethical responsibilities to treat are finished. At another level, the sheer
symbolism of a beating heart, together with the human emotions
of a loving parent or spouse, suggest that these kinds of cases at the
intersection of law, ethics, and medicine will continue.
ARTICLE INFORMATION
Published Online: January 24, 2014.
doi:10.1001/jama.2014.660.
Conflict of Interest Disclosures: The author has
completed and submitted the ICMJE Form for
Disclosure of Potential Conflicts of Interest and
none were reported.
Additional Contributions: Daniel Hougendobler,
JD, MPH, LLM, fellow, O’Neill Institute, provided
valuable research for this Viewpoint.
REFERENCES
1. Mollaret P, Goulon M. Le coma dépassé (mémoire
préliminaire). Rev Neurol (Paris). 1959;101:3-5.
2. Report of the Ad Hoc Committee of the Harvard
Medical School to Examine the Definition of Brain
Death. A definition of irreversible coma. JAMA.
1968;205(6):337-340.
3. President’s Commission for the Study of Ethical
Problems in Medicine and Biomedical and
Behavioral Research. Defining Death: A Report on
the Medical, Legal and Ethical Issues in the
Determination of Death. Washington, DC:
Government Printing Office; 1981.
4. Uniform Determination of Death Act (1981).
http://www.uniformlaws.org/shared/docs
/determination%20of%20death/udda80.pdf.
Accessed January 22, 2014.
5. Temporary Restraining Order, Winkfield v
Children’s Hospital Oakland, No. RG13-707598
(Super Ct Cal, December 23, 2013).
6. Fernandez M, Eckholm E. Pregnant and forced
to stay on life support. New York Times. January 8,
2014:A1. http://www.nytimes.com/2014/01/08/us
/pregnant-and-forced-to-stay-on-life-support.html
?_r=0. Accessed January 8, 2014.
7. Texas Health and Safety Code §671. http://www
.statutes.legis.state.tx.us/Docs/HS/htm/HS.671.htm.
8. Fernandez M. Suing to end life support for
woman and fetus. New York Times. January 15,
2014:A14. http://www.nytimes.com/2014/01/15/us
/suing-to-end-life-support-for-woman-and-fetus
.html. Accessed January 15, 2014.
Opinion Viewpoint
E2 JAMA Published online January 24, 2014 jama.com
